H.J. – The Economist, 11/15/2012
Brazil’s mensalão trial has brought many historic moments (see here and here), and this week saw one more: an impeccably well-connected politico getting such a long prison sentence that even the best lawyer will struggle to save him from doing time. On November 12th José Dirceu, who served as chief of staff for former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2003 to 2005, was sentenced to ten years and ten months in jail for his part in the huge vote-buying scheme. Two other prominent members of the Workers’ Party (PT) also received stiff sentences: Delubio Soares, its former treasurer, got eight years and 11 months in prison, and José Genoino, its former president, six years and 11 months.
It sometimes appears that the Brazilian criminal-justice system locks people up on a whim. Half the prison population has either not yet been tried or is awaiting a final verdict, and much of the other half committed non-violent property or drugs crimes. But for those with resources, it allows huge scope for delay, leeway on sentencing and almost unlimited appeals. The three men, along with the other 22 who have been found guilty of crimes such as money-laundering, corruption, embezzlement and misuse of public money, benefited from a rule known as “privileged forum” which says that top politicians can only be tried for crimes in higher courts. In this case, the Supreme Court, which normally deals with constitutional, not criminal matters, had to decide to take the case. That meant that though the scandal surfaced in 2005, the trial only started this year, in August.
Posted by Brazil Institute
As the biggest corruption trial in Brazilian history comes to an end with convictions of once-powerful politicians, at least one hero has emerged from the mess — the first black member of the country’s Supreme Court.



A rupture with Brazil’s culture of cordiality
September 26, 2012Gregory Michener – Al Jazeera, 9/22/2012
After a six hour trip from Rio de Janeiro to Belo Horizonte, our bus crawled at a snail’s pace as we winded our way to the terminal. The problem wasn’t traffic; the problem was that the bus driver kept stopping to let passengers off at the side of the road, in contravention of the rules. Unable to say “no” to half a dozen or so glib entreaties, the driver delayed us and everyone else.
This typifies the famous culture of cordiality in Brazil. Cordiality can be a mark of chivalry, but it can also be a foil for a culture in which conflict is studiously avoided. Brazilians don’t do well with conflict. Filipe Sobral of Brazil’s Fundação Getúlio Vargas University and Dean Bisseling of the University of Amsterdam analysed teams of Dutch and Brazilian professionals to test responses to “emotional and task conflict”. Brazilians saw conflict as having significantly undermined their team performance and overall satisfaction, whereas it had no such effect on the Dutch.
Conflict avoidance has its costs. This is particularly true in politics, where vigorous inter-branch and inter-party competition-cum-conflict can have a healthful effect on institutional accountability. A culture of cordiality involves not giving offence, and a desire not to offend can lead to accommodation – uneven applications of the rule of law and a reluctance to force critical reforms forward by confronting vested interests.
The mensalão trial – a rupture with political accommodation
In many ways, Brazil’s ongoing mensalão trial (see “Brazil’s ‘trial of the Century’“) represents a dramatic rupture with this institutional tradition, a culture in which the political elite rarely if ever convict and sanction those of their own kind. The trial centres on a political vote buying and money laundering scheme involving more than 35 defendants – bank executives, legislators, even former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Chief of Staff. The mensalão itself – big monthly payments to legislators in exchange for votes – is an expression of the culture of cordiality: unwilling to assume the bully pulpit and shame legislators into yielding votes for the government’s mandate, the President’s men opted for the quiet consent won of bribery.
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